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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20150217-CA
COLORADO STEVEN IRWIN,
Appellant is not incarcerated.
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a restitution order entered on March 19, 2015. R.69-70, 7577; Addendum A (Order of Restitution and Sentence, Judgment, Commitment). This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(e).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue I: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding a restitution
amount in excess of the replacement value of the watches which is in conflict with Utah's
Crimes Victims Restitution Act?
Standard of Review: A trial court's restitution order will not be disturbed "'unless
it exceeds that prescribed by law or [the trial court] otherwise abused its discretion."'

State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,rs, 788 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (alterations in the
original).

Preservation: This issue was preserved by counsel's motion and argument. R. 65;
85:9-13.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes are relevant to the issues on appeal. Their text is
provided in full in Addendum B: Utah Code §77-38a-102, §77-38a-301, §77-38a-302.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
On November 26, 2013, Colorado Steven ltwin ("Mr. ltwin") pleaded guilty to an
amended count of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony, and
Burglary, a third degree felony. R.35-41, 45-50. Mr. !twin admitted that on May 23,
2013, he entered Iron Horse Management, a business owned by Jeff Horsley, and that he
took watches valued in excess of $5,000 from the business. R.2-3, 36; 86:6-7. A total of
102 Rockwell watches were taken in the course of the burglary. R.2.

Mr. ltwin "agree[ d] to pay restitution" as part of the plea agreement that was made
with the State. R.38. On the day that the pleas and sentencing occurred for this matter, the
State did not submit a specified requested restitution amount. R.86: 1-12. The probable
cause statement contained in the Information listed the value of the watches as $39,004.
R.2; R.85:4. The Honorable Charlene Barlow sentenced Mr. Itwin to a suspended prison
term for both felony counts and placed him initially on court probation so that he could
first take care of a pending federal case before being placed on AP&P supervision for this
matter. R.45-50; R.86: 11. As part of his probation, Mr. Itwin was ordered to pay
"restitution in full[,]" but no amount was specified. R.49; 86: 12.
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On November 25, 2014, the State filed a motion seeking restitution in the amount
of $32,753.52 to be awarded to Iron Horse Management. R.63-64. Mr. Irwin filed a
timely objection to the State's motion for order of restitution. R.65. A restitution hearing
for this matter took place on March 5, 2015. R.69-70, 85.
At the hearing, the dispute over the restitution amount centered on whether the
amount should be determined using the Manufactured Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) of
the watches ($39,004), or the replacement costs of the watches ($13, 651.40). R.34, 6162; 85:4-5, 11-12. The State initially asked for a restitution amount of $32,753.52, which
was derived from taking the MSRP value of the watches as determined by the
manufacturer, Rockwell ($39,0004), minus the monies that Iron Horse Management
received from Farmers Insurance for the theft of the watches ($6,250.48). R.57, 61-64;
85:4, 7-9. The State also acknowledged that Farmers Insurance provided a statement of
loss that identified the total value of the stolen watches as being $35,155.48. R.60; 85:4.
The State then conceded that it would accept as complete restitution for Iron Horse
Management a total of $35,155.48 minus the $6,250.48 the victim received from the
insurance company. R.30-34; 85:5-6. Additionally, the State requested that Mr. Irwin
make a restitution payment to Farmers Insurance for $6,250.48. R.85:5.
The State, however, opposed basing the entire restitution amount for the watches
on the replacement costs of the watches ($13,651.40) as was determined by Rockwell in a
victim impact statement which had been submitted for this matter. R.30-34; 85:5-7. To
support the request for basing restitution on the MSRP value of the watches, the State
argued that the victim was deprived of the opportunity to sell the watches "over the last
3

year." R.85:9. The State, however, did not provide any proof of any actual lost
opportunity costs for Iron Horse Management. R.85: 13. The State also did not submit any
proof that the victim could not get 102 Rockwell watches back if the replacement costs
were ordered as the appropriate restitution amount. R.85:12.

Mr. Irwin's counsel argued for a restitution amount of $13, 651.40, the
replacement costs of the watches, as this would return Iron Horse Management back to
the same position that this business was in before the watches were stolen. R.85: 11-13.
That is, the replacement costs would enable Iron Horse Management to buy 102
Rockwell watches, which is the exact number of watches that were taken by Mr. Irwin in
the course of the burglary. R.2; 85:11-12. Mr. Irwin's counsel pointed out that restitution
is "not a punitive measure" but "is designed to make the victim whole." R.85: 11. Mr.
Irwin's counsel also argued that the MSRP value would improperly create a windfall or
financial benefit for the victim. R.85 :9, 11. That is, if Iron Horse Management were given
the MSRP value of $39,004, which is the amount of money the manufacturer
recommended the watches be sold for, this business could then buy 102 Rockwell
watches again for only the replacement costs of $13,651.40, and then tum around and
sell those same 102 watches "at the MSRP price again." R.85:11, 13. (emphasis added).
Thus, Mr. Irwin's counsel argued that the replacement value of $13,651.40 was more
appropriate because it would allow the victim to obtain the 102 Rockwell watches again,
and then the business could "go on to sell [the watches] at whatever cost [it] can get."
R.85:11.
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The trial court acknowledged that the MSRP amount was not the amount needed
for Iron Horse Management to replace the stolen watches, but was instead the amount
that the business "would have received" if they had sold the watches. R.85:9.
Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that the lost opportunity costs would be reflected
in the MSRP value. R.85: 13. The trial court also agreed with the State that restitution
should be based upon the amount that an item sells for, as opposed to the amount that a
business must pay in order to obtain that item. R.85:13-14. The trial court ordered the
total amount of restitution at $35,155.48, the amount ofloss as determined by Farmers
Insurance. R.85: 14. Mr. Irwin was ordered to pay Iron Horse Management $28,905 and
Farmers Insurance $6,250.48. R.85:14. Mr. Irwin filed a timely notice of appeal from the
order of restitution. R. 78-81.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it ordered Mr. Irwin to pay restitution for an amount
that far exceeded the replacement costs of the watches. Utah's Crime Victims Restitution
Act grants pecuniary damages to a victim, but it excludes the ordering of punitive
damages against a defendant. Utah case law also clearly establishes that the purpose of
restitution is to make the victim whole, which is to return the victim to the same
economic position that it was in before the crime had been committed. Thus, restitution
awards should not create a windfall or financial gain for the victim. When the district
court ordered Mr. Irwin to pay an amount of restitution in excess of the replacement
value of the Rockwell watches, the district court improperly created a windfall for Iron
Horse Management and imposed a punitive damage on Mr. Irwin.
5

The trial court also erred in basing the restitution amounts on lost opportunity
costs. In this matter, the State failed to put on any evidence that showed that Iron Horse
Management suffered any lost opportunity costs as a result of Mr. Irwin's theft of the 102
Rockwell watches. Moreover, lost opportunity costs are too speculative and attenuated
from the criminal conduct to justify restitution in this matter. Thus, the replacement value
of the watches, and not the MSRP value, was the appropriate restitution amount for this
matter.

ARGUMENT

II.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding a Restitution
Amount in Excess of the Replacement Value of the Watches as this
Conflicted with Utah's Crimes Victims Restitution Act.

Utah's Crime Victims Restitution Act allows crime victims to be restored to the
economic position that they were in before the crime occurred. The Act provides that in
"a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution."
Utah Code §77-38a-301. Restitution encompasses "full, partial, or nominal payment for
pecuniary damages to a victim." Utah Code §77-38a-102(1 l). Thus, a victim is only
entitled to receive pecuniary damages in a restitution award. State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT
App 146, ,r6, 788 Utah Adv. Rep. 25. '"Pecuniary damages' means all demonstrable
economic injury, whether or not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities
and includes the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise
harmed, and losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or
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exemplary damages and pain and suffering." Utah Code §77-38a-102(6) (emphasis
added).
Pecuniary damages must be demonstrable economic injuries. State v. Brown, 2009
UT App 285, ,Il0, 221 P.3d 273. "Pecuniary damages relating to property are calculated
based on the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otheiwise
harmed." Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,I6 (quotations omitted). "Fair Market Value" is an
amount determined "by what the owner [of the property] could expect to receive, and the
amount a willing buyer would pay to the true owner for the stolen item." Id. at if6
(alterations in original) (quotations omitted). However, using fair market value as the
standard in measuring the victim's loss is often "a sticky wicket, unpredictable in practice
because it is entirely relative, depending on who is doing the buying and who is doing the
selling." State v. Hall, 304 P.3d 677, 681 (Kan. 2013).
Utah case law points out that the true measure of damage is flexible, allowing trial
courts to fashion an equitable award to the victim that addresses the actual losses suffered
by the victim. See Jenkins v. Equipment Center, Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Utah Ct. App.
1994), cert. denied, Jenkins v. Hesston, 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994) ("[t]he primary
objective in rendering an award of damages for conversion is to award the injured party
full compensation for actual losses[,]" and "rules relating to the measure of damages are
flexible, and can be modified in the interest of fairness" (emphasis added) (quotations
omitted)); see State v. Hight, 2008 UT App 118, ,I3, 182 P.3d 922. In some cases, the
purchase price of the items may be most appropriate in determining the actual losses of a
victim. See State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,r15, 82 P .3d 211. In other cases, the
7

purchase price is not the appropriate measure of actual loss to a victim. See State v.

Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,rIO. Ultimately "[t]he appropriate measure of the loss or
damage to a victim is fact-sensitive and will vary based on the facts of a particular case."

Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, if15.
Utah law also makes clear that the appropriate amount of restitution is the amount
that is required to make the victim whole, a process of returning the victim to the position
he or she was in before the crime was committed. See State v. Wadsworth, 2015 UT App
138, ,I13, 351 P.3d 826 (restitution seeks to '"accomplish the purpose of making crime
victims whole for the harms they suffer because of a defendant's criminal conduct"').
Restitution is "' to compensate victims for the harm caused by a defendant and ... to spare
victims the time, expense, and emotional difficulties of separate civil litigation to recover
their damages from the defendant."' Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,I14 (emphasis added).
"[T]he fundamental purpose of compensatory damages is to place the plaintiff [or the
victim] in the same position he would have occupied had the tort not been committed."

Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, ,I26, 96 P.3d 893 (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 903 cmt. a (1979)). Stated another way, "[i]n determining the
measure of recovery, aside from harm to body, emotions or reputation, a balance sheet is
in effect set up by the court in which are stated the items of assets and liabilities that have
been affected by the tort, (a) before the tort, and (b) as they appear at the time of trial."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 906 cmt a. "[I]he tortfeasor is liable only for the

amount of the net harm that he has caused." Id. (emphasis added). Essentially, restitution
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awards make a victim whole by returning the victim to the same economic position that
they were in before the crime occurred. Id.
Outside jurisdictions also agree with Utah that the purpose of restitution is to make
the victim whole by returning the victim to the position they were in before the crime
occurred. See United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[r]estitution
has traditionally been viewed as an equitable device for restoring victims to the position
they had occupied prior to a wrongdoer's actions"); see also People v. Busser, 113
Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) ("[v]ictims are only entitled to an amount of
restitution so as to make them whole, but nothing more, from their actual losses arising
out of the defendants' criminal behavior" (emphasis added)).
Consistent with Utah case law, the Kansas Supreme Court has also emphasized
that the appropriate restitution amount is one that "will compensate the victim for the
actual loss caused by the defendant's crime." Hall, 304 P.3d at 679 (emphasis added).

When determining an appropriate restitution amount, the Hall court refused to employ a
bright-line rule that favored either the retail price or the wholesale cost of inventory that
was stolen from a veterinary clinic. Id. Hall further emphasized that in determining the
actual losses sustained by a victim, a number of factors must be considered, including:
the retail price, which includes a reasonable profit; the wholesale cost charged to
the victim; the setting from which the property was taken; the nature and intended
use of the property; whether a market existed for the product and how robust the
market was; costs associated with an interruption to this market, which might
include costs to maintain stock, electricity, labor, taxes, and shipping; the speed
and ease of obtaining replacement items for sale; and any actual lost sales and any
associated loss of goodwill.
Id. at 682 (emphasis added). Such a list "is exemplary only and not exclusive." Id.
9

In this matter, the trial court erred in granting a restitution amount that exceeded
the replacement value of the watches ($13,65L40), as this is the value that was needed to
make the victim whole. R.30-34; 85:11-13. See also Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, ,I13.
The replacement value of the watches is also the value that represents the actual loss that
was sustained by Iron Horse Management. See Jenkins 869 P.2d at 1004; see also Hall,
304 P.3d at 679. Prior to the burglary and theft, Iron Horse Management had 102
Rockwell watches. R.2. Making the victim whole for actual losses in this matter,
therefore, required granting a restitution award that would allow Iron Horse Management
to once again own 102 Rockwell watches. See Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, ifl3.
In this matter, a victim impact statement was submitted that showed that the
replacement value of the 102 Rockwell watches was $13,651.40. R.30-34; 85:5-7. Thus,
a restitution order for the replacement value of $13,651.40 would have allowed the victim
to once again own 102 Rockwell watches and restore the victim to the economic position
that the business was in prior to the commission of the crimes in this matter. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 906 cmt a. Moreover, the State did not submit any proof
that the victim could not get 102 Rockwell watches back if the replacement costs were
ordered as the appropriate restitution amount. R. 85: 12. Ultimately, the trial court erred in
awarding a restitution amount in excess of the replacement value as this was the proper
amount to make the victim whole.
The Manufacture Suggestive Retail Price ("MSRP") in this matter of $39,004 was
not the value required to make the victim whole in this matter. The problem with retail
prices are that they "can be arbitrarily inflated or deflated by the merchant, and therefore,
10

not realistically represent a true value to the victim." State v. Carter, 544 S.W.2d 334,
338 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). Furthermore, a MSRP value is "[t]he amount of money for
which the company that produces a product recommends that it be sold in stores. MSRP
does not necessarily correspond to the price retailers actually use or to the price
customers are willing to pay. Retailers may need to set their prices below MSRP to move
inventory, especially for items with low demand or in a sluggish economy." 1 (emphasis
added). The MSRP value is an aspirational value of what an item could sell for in a
thriving economy and if consumer demand for the item was high. 2 Volatile market forces
and a lack of consumer demand may, however, prevent an item from selling for its MSRP
value.
Thus, the fluctuating nature of a MSRP value does not always provide a good
standard to use when determining the amount necessary to make the victim whole for a
restitution determination as it does not necessarily correspond to the actual losses
suffered by a victim. See Carter, 544 S.W.2d, at 338. Instead, it may be the wholesale
value of an item, and not its retail value, that properly constitutes the actual losses
suffered by a victim. See Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1930); Hall,
304 P.3d at 679. Cf State v. Islam, 344 P.3d 22 (Or. Ct. App 2015) (the retail value, and
not wholesale value, of the stolen jeans was the correct measure of restitution), review
granted, 357 Ore. 550 (Or. 2015).

1

INVESTIPEDIA, Manufacture's Suggestive Retail Price-MSRP,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/manufacturers-suggested-retail-price-msrp.asp (last visited August 13, 2015).
2
See Id.
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In this matter, the replacement value, and not the MSRP value constituted the
actual losses suffered by the victim. The MSRP value of $39,004 was merely the
arbitrarily inflated value that the watches may have sold for in a thriving economy, and
not indicative of the actual losses of the victim. See Carter, 544 S.W.2d, at 338. The
MSRP value was not the amount needed to return Iron Horse Management to the
economic position it was in before the crimes occurred, which was owning 102 Rockwell
watches. Rather, the replacement value of $13,651.40 was the amount required to return
Iron Horse Management to the economic position it was in prior to the commission of the
crime. Mr. Irwin therefore asks this Court to reverse the trial court's order of restitution
on grounds that the replacement value of $13,651.40 is more properly the amount needed
to make the victim whole and to return the victim to the economic position the business
was in before the crime was committed. See Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, ,rB.
A. The Restitution Value Constituted A Windfall for the Victim
Restitution should not provide a windfall for the victim. See Ludlow, 2015 UT
App 146, ifl3 (the trial court improperly granted a restitution amount that granted the
victim a windfall). Utah case law is consistent with outside jurisdiction case law that
emphasizes that restitution should not create a windfall for the victim. See Simmons v.

State, 205 S. W.3d 194, 198 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (restitution "is to make the victim whole
in relation to the crime committed, not to put the victim in a better position before the
crime occurred" (emphasis in original)), appeal granted 159 S. W.3d 312 (Ark. 2004); see

also People v. Chappelone, 107 Cal.Rprt.3d 895, 905 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) ("[a]
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restitution order is intended to compensate the victim for its actual loss and is not
intended to provide the victim with a windfalf' (emphasis added)).

In this matter, the trial court improperly awarded the victim a windfall or financial
benefit by ordering an amount that far exceeded the replacement value of the watches.
The trial court ordered Mr. Irwin to pay a total amount of restitution at $35,155.48, the
amount of loss as determined by Farmers Insurance. R.85:14. Mr. Irwin was also ordered
to pay Iron Horse Management $28,905 and Farmers Insurance $6,250.48. The trial
court agreed with the State that restitution should be based upon the amount that an item
sells for, as opposed to the amount that a business must pay in order to obtain that item.
R.85:13-14.
The problem with the restitution amount ordered by the trial court is that it created
a windfall for the victim by allowing the victim to repurchase 102 Rockwell watches at
the replacement cost of $13,651.40, pocket the remaining monies, and then make even
more additional monies by selling the Rockwell watches "at the MSRP price again."
R.85:11, 13. (emphasis added). The restitution amount ordered in this matter, therefore,
resulted in putting Iron Horse Management in a far superior or better financial position
than it was in before the crime occurred, as opposed to putting it in a similar financial
position. Id. This advantageous result for Iron Horse Management clearly conflicts with
established Utah case law and outside jurisdictions that prohibit a victim from receiving a
windfall from restitution awards, and instead requires that a victim be returned to the
economic position that they were in prior to the occurrence of the crime. See Ludlow,
2015 UT App 146, ,I13; see Chappelone, 107 Cal.Rprt.3d, at 905.
13

Because the restitution award in this matter constituted a windfall for Iron Horse
management, Mr. Irwin requests that this Court reverse the trial court's holding and
instead find that the replacement value of the watches of $13,651.40 is the appropriate
restitution amount for this matter.
B. The Restitution Value Constituted Punitive Damages Against Irwin
Utah case law makes clear that allowing for restitution in criminal cases has a twofold purpose: 1) it provides pecuniary damages for the victim, and 2) it functions as a
rehabilitative penalty to "deter the defendant, and others, from future illegal behavior."

State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, iJ18, 214 P.3d 104. And, although there is a disciplinary
and rehabilitative aspect to restitution, a trial court is not granted free license to impose
"punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering" when determining an
appropriate restitution amount. Utah Code §77-38a-102(6). Thus, because the primary
purpose of restitution is not to punish a defendant, trial courts cannot set amounts in
excess of the actual losses to the victim in an effort to punish a defendant. Id; see also

Jenkins 869 P.2d at 1004; see also Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, ifl3. Cf Lawrence v.
Intermountain, Inc., 2010 UT App 313, iJ23, 243 P.3d 508 ("the very purpose of punitive
damages is to deter further wrongdoing"). After all, in the context of criminal cases, a
trial court has incarceration, fines, and other methods available to it for punishment
purposes. See State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, iJ64, 353 P.3d 55, ("[f]ines, imprisonment,
and even execution may be imposed [by a trial court] depending upon the enormity of the
crime"), as amended (Mar. 13, 2015), reh'g denied (June 30, 2015). See also Newman,
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144 F.3d at 540 ("[p]ayment of restitution is not an affirmative disability or restraint that
operates in a manner analogous to imprisonment.").
The idea that Utah's Crime Victims Restitution Act's main purpose is not punitive
is exemplified by the changes that the Utah Legislature has made to its victim restitution
statutes. Before 1995, the old victim restitution statute used to allow a trial court to
require that the "the defendant make restitution up to double the amount ofpecuniary

damages to the victim or victims of the offense of which the defendant has pleaded
guilty, is convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by the
defendant to the sentencing court ... " Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(3)(a)(i)(1990)
(emphasis added). See also State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah 1992) ("the
restitution statute's wording [prior to 1995] clearly contemplates penal as well as
compensatory purposes for restitution"). However, this part of the statute allowing for a
trial court to double the amount of pecuniary damages to be imposed for a restitution
award was deleted by the Utah Legislature in 1995. See 1995 Utah Laws Ch. 301 (H.B.
333). With this deletion, the Utah Legislature intended to remove the more punitive
purpose of restitution determinations. See State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, ,r12, 240 P.3d
780 ("[t]o discern legislative intent, we look first to the statute's plain language [and] ...
read the plain language of [the] statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters" (quotations omitted)).
In this matter, the restitution amount constituted punitive damages against Mr.
Iiwin because this value exceeded the amounts necessary to replace the 102 Rockwell
watches and make the business victim whole. See Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, if13.
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Because Utah's Crime Victims Restitution Act prohibited the trial court from imposing
punitive damages on Mr. liwin, the trial court should not have awarded a restitution
amount that exceeded the replacement value of the watches, as doing so improperly
punished Mr. ltwin through the excessive restitution amount. See Utah Code §77-38a102(6). Furthermore, in this matter, Mr. Itwin pied guilty to two third degree felony
matters, thus the trial court had the opportunity to impose punishments on Mr. Iiwin
through different means other than by awarding a restitution amount that exceeded the
actual losses sustained by Iron Horse Management. R.35-41, 45-50. See also Houston,
2015 UT 40, iJ64. Because the MSRP value constituted punitive damages in this matter,
which conflicts with Utah's restitution statute, Mr. Itwin asks this Court to reverse the
trial court's restitution ruling and find that the replacement value of the watches of
$13,651.40 is the appropriate restitution amount for this matter.
C. The Restitution Value Was Improperly Based on Lost Opportunity Costs.
Utah's Crime Victims Restitution Act compensates victims for actual
demonstrable losses, not unsubstantiated hypothetical losses. See Brown, 2009 UT App
285, iJlO. The specific types of actual pecuniary losses that the Act allows for are:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or
destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment
rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the
place of treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted
in bodily injury to a victim;
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due
to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the
16

victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the
offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the
death of a victim.
Utah Code §77-38a-302(5)(b).
This Court recently held that the plain language of Utah Code §77-38a-302(5)(b)
is not meant to limit the relevant facts that a court should consider when awarding
restitution amounts. See Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, ,r21 (when determining
restitution, "a court must consider all facts that are relevant to the case, including ones
beyond those listed in [Utah Code §77-38a-302(5)(b)]"). However, the restitution statute
does limit a victim's damages to those that "aris[e] out of the facts or events constituting
the defendant's criminal activities." Id. at ifl8 (alteration in original). And, in the context
of a wrongful death action, the Utah Supreme Court has previously held that lost
opportunity costs do not necessarily constitute a valid measure of damages when they fail
to measure the actual loss that is sustained by the victim. Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105,
111, (Utah 1982).
When determining proper restitution amounts, "Utah has adopted a modified but
for test to determine whether pecuniary damages actually arise out of criminal activities."

State v. Birkeland, 2011 UT App 227, ,r11, 258 P.3d 662 (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted). This test requires a showing "that (1) the damages would not
have occurred but for the conduct underlying the ... [defendant's] conviction and (2) the
causal nexus between the [criminal] conduct and the loss ... is not too attenuated (either
factually or temporally)." Id. at if 11. (quotations omitted). See also State v. Ruiz, 2013 UT
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App 166, iJl6, 305 P.3d 223; State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, iJiJ18-19, 40 P.3d 1143;
State v. Harvell, 2009 UT App 271, ififl3-15, 220 P.3d 174 (because the brake system
repairs and iPod replacement were too attenuated from defendant's reckless driving,
restitution should not have been ordered for these items).
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court addressed a case where the victim of unlawful
sexual activity with a sixteen or seventeen year old requested restitution because she "had
moved from Page, Arizona, to Flagstaff, Arizona, because the defendant was a prominent
member of the community in Page it had become difficult for [the victim and her mother]
to continue residing there. The trial and hearings were held in Kanab, Utah." State v.
Brown, 2014 UT 48, iJif4, 8n.1, 342 P.3d 239. The victim requested restitution for lost
wages incurred attending the hearings and the cost of traveling to the hearings. Id. if6.
The Utah Supreme Court held that the "restitution at issue in this case is not properly
compensable under" the statutory definition of pecuniary damages. Id. iJif22-23.
"[T]here is no question that such damages would not be compensable pecuniary damages
in an action for sexual assault and battery under Utah law'' and the "Restatement
generally forecloses recovery of costs and expenses incurred in the maintenance of, or
related to, litigation." Id. if23. "On that basis," the court "conclude[d] that the lost wages
and expenses requested for [the victim] are not 'pecuniary damages' compensable as an
element of restitution." Id. iJ24. Because the case could be resolved on that basis alone,
the court did not address the modified "but for" test. Id. Mr. Irwin's case should be
handled similarly.
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In this matter, the State failed to prove that Iron Horse Management suffered any
actual lost opportunity costs as a result of the criminal conduct in this matter. R.85:13.
The State argued that the victim was deprived of the opportunity to sell the watches "over
the last year." R.85:9. However, there was no evidence that Iron Horse Management was
in the business of selling watches, or that it would have attempted to sell the watches had
the watches not been stolen. See R.85:13. There was no evidence presented that Iron
Horse Management had no comparable merchandise to sell its customers. See

Chappelone, l 07 Cal.Rprt.3d, at 910. There was no evidence presented that Iron Horse
Management lost any profits due to the burglary or that its customers were deprived of
any sales. R.85:13; see also Chappelone, 107 Cal.Rprt.3d, at 910. Ultimately, the lost
opportunity costs addressed by the State were not "demonstrable," only speculative, and
therefore too attenuated from the crime. See Utah Code §77-38a-102(6) (Pecuniary
damages are ones that are "demonstrable." 3); see also Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ,rIO;

State v. Birkeland, 2011 UT App 227, ,rI 1; Osteen v. State, 616 So. 2d 1215, 1218 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (restitution was not awarded for lost business expenses because the
measure of damages was "speculative and difficult to prove.").
In awarding the restitution amount in this matter, the trial court concluded that the
lost opportunity costs would be reflected in the MSRP value. R.85: 13. This is incorrect,
however, as: 1) the State failed to prove that Iron Horse Management suffered any actual

3

Demonstrable means "[ o]bvious or apparent." The Free Dictionary, DEMONSTRABLE,

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/demonstrable (last visited Sept. 9, 2015).
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lost opportunity costs4, R.85:13, and 2) the MSRP value constitutes the optimal amount
the watches could have sold for in a thriving economy with high consumer demand, not
the actual losses sustained by Iron Horse Management. See Carter, 544 S.W.2d, at 338.
Furthermore, the State failed to show that the economic and market conditions were
strong enough to have allowed Iron Horse Management to receive the full MSRP value of
the watches even if they had tried to sell the watches "over the last year." R:85:9; see also
Hall, 304 P.3d, 682. The trial court also never examined the realities of the economic

market before applying the MSRP value of the watches to the restitution amount.
R.85:13-14. Thus, the trial court erred in applying the MSRP value to determine the lost
opportunity costs for Iron Horse Management when the record failed to show that this
business suffered any actual and determinable lost opportunities whatsoever. Id. Instead,
the trial court should have ordered the replacement value of the watches as this amount
would have allowed Iron Horse Management to obtain I 02 Rockwell watches again, and
have allowed the business to decide whether it wished to keep the watches, or sell them
for whatever price could be obtained in a fluctuating market. R.85: 11.
D. This Issue Was Preserved.
Mr. Irwin's counsel preserved the issue that the trial court erred in awarding a
restitution amount in excess of the replacement value of the watches. R. 65; 85:9-13.
Mr. Irwin's counsel argued that restitution is "not a punitive measure" but "is designed to
4

There does not appear to be any accepted calculation for determining lost opportunity
costs. "Since opportunity costs frequently relate to future events, they are often difficult
to quantify." Encyclopedia.com, OPPORTUNITY COSTS, http://www.encyclopedia.
com/topic/Opportunity_Cost.aspx (last visited Sept. 10, 2015); see also Carvell, 641 P.2d
at 111.
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make the victim whole." R. 85:11. Mr. Irwin's counsel also argued against applying the
MSRP value in this matter as it would improperly "create a windfall" or financial benefit
for the victim. R. 85:9, 11. Mr. Irwin's counsel requested a restitution amount of $13,
651 .40, the "replacement costs of the watches," as this would return Iron Horse
Management "back [to] the same position" that this business was in before the watches
were stolen. R. 85:11-13. Lastly, Mr. Irwin's counsel argued against a restitution amount
that included "lost opportunity cost[ s]" because the State failed to provide any proof that
Iron Horse Management had sustained "some lost opportunity" as a result of the crimes
committed in this matter. R.85: 13.
Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, if this Court finds that this issue
was not preserved, this Court may review it for plain error. Plain error requires reversal
where "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome ... " State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). First, as
explained previously, an error exists because the trial court failed to award a restitution
amount that would make the victim whole and compensate the victim for actual damages.

See Jenkins, 869 P.2d at 1004; see also Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, ifl3. Instead, the
trial court improperly awarded a restitution amount that created a windfall for Iron Horse
Management and imposed a punitive damage on Mr. Irwin. State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT
App 146, if 13.
Second, the error was obvious. The "obviousness requirement poses no rigid and
insurmountable barrier to review." State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989),
21

cert denied, Eldredge v. Utah, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Here, the error should have been

obvious to the trial court as the plain language of Utah's Crime Victim's Restitution Act
and relevant Utah case law requires that the appropriate amount of restitution is the
amount required to compensate for actual damages sustained by the victim. Utah Code
§77-38a-102(6); see also Jenkins, 869 P.2d at 1004. This further means that the victim
should be returned to the position it was in prior to the commission of the crime. Onyx
Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, ,126.

Third, the error was prejudicial. An error is prejudicial when "'there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome[,]'" '" absent the error.'" State v. Cox,
2012 UT App 234, 12, 286 P.3d 15. Mr. Irwin has been prejudiced by the trial court
finding as his financial obligation in this matter far exceeds the amount that is appropriate
to cover the actual losses that were sustained by Iron Horse Management. If the trial court
had ordered the amount of restitution that was necessary to make the victim whole in this
matter, Mr. Irwin's total restitution obligation would have been $13,651.40, and not
$35,155.48. R.85:14.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Mr. Irwin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
entry of the trial court's restitution order and find that the replacement value of the
watches of $13,651.40 is the appropriate restitution amount for this matter.

SUBMITTED this

/ 'ff"- day of September, 2015.

~ 2/.,d

TERESA L. WELCH
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Tab A

SIM GILL, #6389
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
WILLIAMJ. CARLSON#ll528
Deputy District Attorney
8080 S. Redwood Rd., Suite 1100
West Jordan, Utah 84088
(385)468-7546

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
RESTITUTION ORDER
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 131401107
COLORADO IRWIN,
Defendant

Judge Charlene Barlow

THE COURT, having allowed defendant a foll hearing on restitution in compliance with
Utah Code Ann §77-38a-202(4), hereby orders the Defendant to pay $35,155.48 as follows:
$6,250.48 shall be paid to Fanners Insurance and $28,905.00 shall be prud to Iron Horse
Mangaement c/o Jeff Horsley. Adult Probation and Parole shall establish the payment plan for
Defendant as a term of his probation.
DATED this _ _ _day of _ _ _ _ _ _ 2015.

March 09 1 2015 09:52 AM

00000751 of2

Judge Charlene Barlow
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

@
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March 09, 2015 09:52 AM
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@

3RD PIST, COURT - WEST JORDAN
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE

~

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 131401107 FS
Judge:
CHARLENE BARLOW
March 10, 2015
Date:

COLORADO STEVEN IRWIN,
Defendant.

Clerk:
krisff
DEFENDANT INFOaMATION
Date of birth: January 23, 19B9
Sheriff Office#: 357492
CHARGES
1, THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 11/26/2013 Guilty
2. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 11/26/2013 Guilty
Restitution
Amount: $6250,48 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: FARMERS INSURANCE
Restitution
Amount: $28905.00
Pay in behalf of: C/O JEFF HORSLEY IRON HORSE MANAGEMENT
Minutes created to reflect order of restitution that was signed by the Court on 3/9/15

Date:
CHARLENE BARLOW
District Court Judge

0000077
Printed: 06/22/15 13:33:59
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
CHANGE OF PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
COLORADO STEVEN IRWIN,
Defendant.

Case No: 131401107 FS
Judge:
CHARLENE BARLOW
Date:
November 26, 2013

~

vii}

PRESENT
Clerk:
pamfw
Prosecutor: GRAVES, JOSHUA N
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SEAMA.~, CHRISTINE M

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 23, 1989
Sheriff Office#: 357492
Audio
Tape Number:
36
Tape Count: 10:05
CHARGES
1. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 11/26/2013 Guilty
2. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 11/26/2013 Guilty
· Defendant waives the reading of the Information.
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
HEARING

On the record, on State's motion, Count 1 is amended to F3 as per West Valley City vs
McDonald, defendant pleads Guilty to amended Count 1, defendant pleads Guilty to Count
2 as charged, Defendant is sentenced today.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

-0000045
~rinted: 06/22/15 13:28:21
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Case No: 131401107 Date:

Nov 26, 2013

Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
Release to Federal custody.
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The charges in this case are concurrent.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge# 1
Fine: $5000.00
Suspended: $5000.00
Due: $0.00
Charge# 2

Fine: $sooo.oo
Suspended; $5000.00
Due: $0.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$10000.00
$10000.00
$0
$0
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION

The defendant is placed on probation for lB month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Good behavior court probation.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
No other violations.
Notify the court of any address ohange.
Defendant on Court probation until he is released from his Federal custody, then
probation with AP&P will be set up.
Pay restitution in full.
Defendant waives timely filing of restitution by the State. The motion for restitution
will be filed within a year, Defendant waives his right to a timely hearing on the
restitution.
Within 10 days of release from Federal custody, defendant ordered to contact his
attorney to set a aeview of Sentence hearing to set of probation conditions.

0000046
Printed: 06/22/15 13:28:21

Case No: 131401107 Date:

Nov 26, 2013

Review hearing set.
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 07/08/2014
Ti me : o8 : 3 o a •m.
Location: WJ Courtroom 3~
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD
SUITE 1701
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088
Before Judge: CHARLENE BARLOW

Date:

CHARLENE BARLOW
District Court Judge
Individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative aids and
services) should call 3rd Dist. Court - West Jordan at (801)233-9700 three days prior
to the. hearing. For TTY service call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128. The general
information phone number is (801) 233-9700.
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77-38a-102. Definitions.
77-38a-102.
As used in this chapter:
(1)

"Conviction" includes a:
(a)

judgment of guilt;

(b)

a plea of guilty; or

(c)

a plea of no contest.

11
(2)
Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.

(3)

"Department" means the Department of Corrections.

(4)
"Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the
condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make
restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition.
(5)

"Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution.

(6)
"Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market value of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost
earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain
and suffering.
(7)
"Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and
defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which
the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest.
(8)
"Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any
agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where
charges are dismissed without a plea.
(9)
"Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and
the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at

that time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him
on condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance
agreement.
( 10) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which,
following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance.
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for
expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may be further
defined by law.
(12)
(a)

"Reward" means a sum of money:

(i)
offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of
an offender; and
(ii)
that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information,
except that the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an
accomplice, or a bounty hunter.

(b)
"Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to
the public.
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has
been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted.
(14)

(a)
"Victim" means any person or entity, including the Utah Office for Victims
of Crime, who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of
the defendant's criminal activities.
(b)

"Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice.

Amended by Chapter 147, 2015 General Session

77-38a-301. Restitution

77-38a-301
Convicted defendant may be required to pay.
In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution.

Enacted by Chapter 137, 2001 General Session

Q

77-38a-302. Restitution criteria.
77-38a-302.
( 1)
When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct
for which the defendant has agreed ·10 make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14)
and in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria
and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5).
(2)
In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and courtordered restitution.
(a)
"Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim
for all losses caused by the defendant.
(b)
"Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the
time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing.
(c)
Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as
provided in Subsection ( 5).
(3)
If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this
part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record.
(4)
If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.

(5)
(a)
For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall
include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or
to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity,
includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b)
In determining.the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:

(i)
the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or
loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;

(ii)
the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and
devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical
care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing
recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and
rehabilitation;
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense
resulted in bodily injury to a victim;
(v)
up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are
lost due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that
were owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current
employment at the time of the offense; and
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.
( c)
In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered
restitution, the court shall consider:
(i)

the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b );

(ii)
the financial resources of the defendant, as disclosed in the financial
declaration described in Section 77-3 8a-204;
(iii) the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the
other obligations of the defendant;
(iv) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis
or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(v)
the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(vi) other circumstances that the court determines may make restitution
inappropriate.

(d)

(i)
Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all
restitution orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one
year after sentencing.
(ii)
Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court
within one year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of
Pardons and Parole.
(e)
The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after
sentencing, refer an order of judgment and commitment back to the court
for determination of restitution.

Amended by Chapter 74, 2013 General Session

